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Figure 1: Chinese advertisement in Canary Wharf Station, London, 2017 
In the largely monolingual landscape of the London Underground, the advertisement in the 
photo above stands out with its prominent display of Simplified Chinese and a young 
Chinese woman doing a very “Chinese” thing – taking a picture of the food on the table with 
her phone. The use of Chinese idiomatic expressions in the speech bubbles and the creative 
code-mixing in the slogan make it clear that the advertisement is intended for bilingual 
Chinese speakers. While the subtle language play might be opaque to non-Chinese speakers, 
the simple presence of the advertisement illustrates the premise of this special issue: Chinese, 
or more precisely Mandarin Chinese, is gaining popularity and prominence in the world.  
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Recent statistics seems to agree. In the surveys conducted by the Modern Language 
Associations in 2009 and 2013 (Goldberg et al. 2015), the enrolment in Chinese language 
classes in U.S. universities increased by 51% from 2002 to 2006, second only to Arabic 
(126%), and continued to rise by 2% from 2009 to 2013, despite the decrease in the total 
enrolment in all languages classes during the same period. Similar trends were also observed 
in the UK (Zhu Hua and Li Wei 2014). But the higher education sectors of the UK and US 
represents only a fraction of the global expansion of Chinese language education. According 
to Hanban (formerly known as National Office of Teaching Chinese as a Foreign language, or 
NOTCFL in short), in 2013, five million people took the HSK (Chinese Proficiency Test) 
worldwide, a dramatic increase from 750,000 test-takers in 2010. The increase of interest in 
learning the Chinese language is further boosted by the ambitious project of Hanban to 
establish Confucius Institutes around the world, emulating the British Council, Alliance 
Francaise, and Goethe Institute in their shared objective to strengthen national soft power 
through language and culture. As of 2016, there are 512 Confucius Institutes and 1073 
Confucius Classrooms in 140 countries on 5 continents, and its expansion is most noticeable 
in East and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the number of 
international students studying at Chinese universities also reached a historical high of 442, 
773 in 2016, with 60% coming from Asia, followed by 18% from Europe, and 11% from Africa 
(Marsh 2017).  
While these numbers paint a rather optimistic outlook, the official promotion of Chinese 
language learning and teaching has not gone without challenges and resistance. Despite its 
economic progress, China is still widely perceived as an authoritarian state. As Ding and 
Saunders (2006) argue, factors such as unsatisfactory human rights records, tightened 
political censorship, and general lack of freedom of speech, consequently undermine China's 
soft power and diminish public interest in Chinese language and culture. In fact, several 
Confucius Institutes in the West have been criticised and even closed over growing concerns 
about human rights and academic freedom (Guttenplan 2012; Marcus 2013; Sahlins 2013). 
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Secondly, Taiwan provides an alternative destination for learning Mandarin Chinese, and its 
Ministry of Education has established overseas language teaching centres similar to the 
Confucius Institutes. Finally, among the Chinese diaspora, the global rise of Standard 
Mandarin Chinese is also sometimes perceived as a threat to the diverse linguistic and 
cultural identities that have characterized overseas Chinese communities over centuries 
(Semple 2009; Zhu Hua and Li Wei 2014).  
These undercurrents as discussed above point to a more complex reality behind the rise 
of Chinese globally, where language ideology and practices are entangled with economic 
incentives, political ideologies, and cultural identities. This special issue provides a timely 
and valuable contribution to our understanding of this entanglement. Taking us from 
Kathmandu, Nepal, to Taiwan, to Vancouver, Canada, each of the papers situates the 
discussion in diverse geopolitical contexts and offers concrete analysis of how the shift in the 
political and economic landscape of nation-states on the macro level impacts individual 
decisions and practices on the micro level. Drawing upon a range of key concepts and themes 
in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, this special issue also prompts us to reflect 
upon the parallels and divergences between Chinese as an emerging global language and the 
status quo of English. In this discussion, I attempt to bring together these diverse 
perspectives and approaches through the lens of Bourdieu’s social theory of practice, 
focussing particularly on the concepts of cultural capital, field, and habitus.  
1. Material versus Symbolic Power 
One direct consequence of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy is that more and more 
people are learning the language for both short- and long-term material benefits. This view 
of language as commodity, characteristic of neoliberal ideology (Holborow 2015), enhances 
the material power of Chinese. Meanwhile, as the three papers in the special issue have 
shown, a variety of historical, cultural, and social factors of local contexts have also 
constrained the expansion of the symbolic power of the Chinese language. This economic 
motivation is most evident in Sharma's study of the Nepalese tourism industry, where the 
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ability to speak Chinese, in however 'truncated' form, could immediately generate more 
income in the forms of generous tips by Chinese tourists or, in the long run, a more 
competitive salary, and where the linguistic landscape of an entire neighbourhood changed 
to tailor to the tastes of mainland Chinese tourists. Less transparent links between language 
and monetary profits are given in Fang and Duff's paper, when their participants chose to 
study Chinese for a better career prospect, and in Chen's paper, when increased encounter 
with mainland tourists led to accommodation to Mandarin Chinese. The appeal of the 
Chinese language, however, seems restricted to its potential economic benefits. 
Language, according to Bourdieu (1986), is an example of cultural capital which 
manifests itself in three states: embodied (e.g. pronunciations), objectified (e.g. textbooks, 
dictionaries), and institutionalised (e.g. tests and exams). Materially, cultural capital could 
be converted into economic capital; symbolically, it could also promote upward mobility in 
the social hierarchy. Most importantly, this conversion process, as Bourdieu points out, is 
contingent upon the appropriation of the language by individual agents. In other words, the 
material and symbolic powers of language depend on how well they are mastered by learners.  
While it seems that even partial competence in the Chinese language could generate 
economic benefits in the Nepalese tourism context, it is unclear whether knowledge of the 
language leads to any change in the social prestige of its learners, i.e. social capital. In 
contrast, English, as many researchers (e.g. Pennycook 1994) have found around the world, 
not only boosts employability in the globalized service economy, it also still enjoys higher 
social prestige, and maintaining global symbolic dominance. In other post-colonial contexts 
such as Hong Kong, researchers (e.g. Lai 2001) have also found that English retains its high 
social prestige despite the number of people learning Chinese for pragmatic reasons has 
increased. Although Nepal has never been colonised, British influence has reached this 
landlocked country through the East Indian Company and the legacy of Gurkha (Nepali 
nationals recruited by the British Army and the armies of other British colonies). The first 
schools established by the elite ruling class in Nepal at the end of 19th century borrowed the 
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British curriculum and used English as the medium of instruction (Poudel 2016), and 
English has remained a compulsory subject in both private and public schools from the first 
grade (Sharma). The mountainous landscapes of the country and its rich cultural heritage 
have also made it a popular destination for international tourists, especially backpackers and 
trekkers. English has been the default lingua franca in the Nepalese tourism industry, until 
the recent influx of mainland Chinese tourists. When the tour guide interviewed by Sharma 
explained "They (Chinese tourists) don't speak English much. There is no use when only we 
speak it and they don't.”, he is simultaneously pointing out the material devaluation of the 
English language and maintaining its symbolic power by using it to distinguish 'us' from 
'them'. 
Sharma’s study serves a powerful reminder that when we talk about the emergence of 
Chinese as a global language, it is often added to an already vibrant “multilingual and 
multicultural space” (Sharma; see also Sharma and Phyak 2017) that were shaped by former 
colonial powers and current globalisation processes. In addition to English, Hindi has also 
exerted a heavy influence on Nepali society and culture thanks to shared border, religious 
practices, and the popularity of Indian TV and Bollywood films. Although as Sharma 
observes, recent political and economic tension between these two countries have seemed to 
motivate some Nepalis to learn the Chinese language in order to distance themselves from 
Indian influences, such a cultural shift would presumably take more than one generation to 
complete. 
The separation between material and symbolic values is even more evident when 
Mandarin Chinese is perceived to threaten the linguistic and cultural autonomy of other 
varieties of Chinese. In Fang and Duff's study, the student from Hong Kong is learning 
Mandarin Chinese for purely instrumental reasons and reluctant to embrace popular cultural 
products from mainland China because her whole life "was engulfed with Cantonese popular 
culture." And the difficulty in embodiment was visceral when the Taiwanese clerk shared 
with Chen that she would get literally "tongue-tied" by over-curling her tongue when 
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speaking to mainland Chinese tourists. These experiences further suggest that when Chinese 
language is acquired as a form of cultural capital, it is mainly converted into economic 
capital and rarely into social capital (Bourdieu 1986). In other words, its symbolic power has 
not grown along with its material power, as some might have assumed. This leads me to the 
second theme which emerges out of the three papers -- the politics and economics of 
difference.  
2. The Politics & Economics of Difference  
Similar to the Nepali situation described by Sharma, the growing Chinese economy has also 
brought an influx of mainland Chinese tourists to Taiwan since 2008, but here the increased 
exposure to Putonghua has paradoxically strengthened the symbolic power of Taiwan 
Mandarin. Spencer Chen explains this diachronic shift using the concept of indexicality. 
Positioned as a less prestigious, ‘sub-standard’ variety in the past, Taiwan Mandarin has 
come to index nationalist pride and reinforce linguistic and cultural boundaries when the 
political and economic borders between Taiwan and mainland China are becoming more 
permeable. It provides a contemporary example of how political and cultural ideologies 
influence perceptions of linguistic differences (Irvine and Gal 2000).   
 After 1949, both the Chinese Communist Party in mainland China and the Nationalist 
Kuomingtang party in Taiwan embarked upon a project of establishing standard national 
languages Putonghua and Taiwan Guoyu in their respective territories. As they were both 
based on the dialect of Beijing, these two standard varieties are mutually intelligible. As part 
of the standardisation process, other varieties of Chinese, such as Cantonese, were relegated 
as regional dialects in mainland China, even when they are mutually unintelligible with 
Putonghua; in Taiwan, Taiwan Mandarin was considered as a non-standard form. Chen 
observes that such standard language ideology is still upheld by some speakers of Taiwan 
Mandarin (Excerpt 1), who perceive the non-retroflex as a linguistic deficiency rather than 
difference. This hierarchical relationship was unsettled by mass tourism from mainland 
China, when Putonghua was introduced into the everyday sociolinguistic scene of Taiwan 
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and changes the indexical field of Taiwan Guoyu. Their close proximity means another 
variety that is linguistically more distant from Putonghua was needed in order to maintain 
an independent political and cultural identity.  
Although the differences between Taiwan Mandarin and Putonghua are many (as 
Zhu Hua and Li Wei 2014 note, there is even a cross-strait dictionary), the linguistic features 
commented on by Chen’s participants, e.g. retroflexion and intonation patterns, are largely 
gradient in nature.  (There was one example of syntactic difference in Excerpt 3, which in my 
opinion, are two different expressions. It is also quite common in Putonghua to say ni 
zhende hen meiyou wenhua, the second expression mei wenhua zhen kepai would add 
emphasis.). These linguistic features, to Chen’s participants, do not simply index a variety of 
Chinese spoken in mainland China but a whole range of other characteristics in their N+ 
indexicality. As we see on Amy’s map (Figure 4), the evaluation of linguistic differences 
extends to other social stereotypes beyond language – Beijingers sound overbearing and 
unpleasant while people in Hong Kong and Macau are perceived ‘cool.’  Thus, the process of 
revalorizing Taiwan Mandarin is also simultaneously a semiotic process of reconfiguring the 
indexicality of Putonghua, creating a separate social and cultural group indexed by linguistic 
differences.  
In addition to foregrounding nationalist identity, highlighting the linguistic 
differences between Taiwan Mandarin and Putonghua also helps to re-organize the social 
division of labour (Irvine 1989), in which the former is associated with the role of tourists 
and consumers and the latter with the role of hosts and service providers.  As Bourdieu (1986) 
argues, the way in which cultural capital is transmitted and acquired (e.g. language, 
literature, art, and education) often disguises it as a legitimate competence instead of a 
capital, but in fact, it also follows the logic of exchange and yields profits proportionate to the 
distinction of its owner. In other words, the scarcer a cultural capital is, the higher material 
and symbolic values does it carry. The value of cultural distinction is particularly visible in 
tourist economy, which thrives on differences, but only to the extent such differences are still 
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comprehensible and communicable. In situations where the host and guest languages are 
mutually unintelligible, tour guides often double as linguistic and cultural translators 
(Jaworski & Thurlow 2010). In this special issue for example, one student interviewed by 
Sharma in the Chinese language programme is motivated to learn Chinese in order to 
introduce her native Newari culture to Chinese tourists. On the other hand, the proximity 
between host and guest languages and cultures facilitates mutual comprehension but fails to 
provide the essential tourist experience (Hall-Lew and Lew 2014), and gradient linguistic 
variations are thus accentuated and even performed to authenticate a sense of foreignness 
(Schilling-Estes 1998). Tourism encounters described in Chen’s paper is akin to the second 
kind of situation. Even though we do not yet know empirically whether the linguistic 
differences between Putonghua and Taiwan Mandarin are consciously performed, it would 
be interesting to note how, in addition to geopolitical differences, the tourism context is also 
conducive for linguistic variation.   
The pressure on Taiwan Mandarin in the face of the global spread of Mandarin 
Chinese is also palpably felt in the Chinese diaspora. As Zhu and Li (2014) note, the term 
‘Global Chinese’ has expanded over the years to include a wide variety of languages spoken 
by the Chinese communities living overseas. These different languages could provide “a 
strong source of identity and self-esteem” for their speakers especially since they tend to be 
perceived as a homogenous ethnic group by non-Chinese (McKay and Wong 1996: 589).  
However, as Zhu and Li (2014) also observed, the teachers and managers of the official 
Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms often lacked the awareness of the linguistic 
and cultural diversity of overseas Chinese community and embodied standard language 
ideologies in their teaching by legitimising Putonghua and relegating other varieties as 
merely dialects. While some ethnic Chinese learners questioned the institutional 
representation of language and culture, they hesitated to correct the teachers’ mistakes (see 
also Li Wei 2003). On the other hand, the teachers were also observed to avoid politically 
sensitive topics such as the One Child policy (31). If the heritage language classroom is a 
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space where linguistic and ideological differences are quietly negotiated and contested, 
popular culture, as Fang and Duff’s study demonstrates, provides an opportunity for 
students to explore and engage with the underlying ideologies more openly and critically.  
3. The Reflexive Language Learner: Structure vs. Agency 
Although the three papers in this special issue set out from the same premise – the rise of 
Global Chinese, they have also interestingly illustrated a wide spectrum of individual 
responses to this phenomenon, from eager acceptance to active resistance.  A striking 
example comes from Bal Sharma’s interview with Namrata (Excerpt 1), in which she used the 
phrase ‘I heard’ or ‘I have heard’ three times to explain why she was learning Mandarin 
Chinese. The frequent mention of the economic lexicon further shows how much the public 
discourse about China’s investments in Nepal has influenced her individual decision. 
However, the neoliberal public discourse though prevalent, does not provide motivation for 
all language learners. As Zhu Hua and Li Wei (2014) found in their study, surprisingly, 
students took up Mandarin Chinese as a foreign language for a plethora of personal reasons, 
some as mundane as love for Chinese food. These divergent observations point to the 
necessity of considering the individual language learner as ‘a complex social being’ (McKay 
and Wong 1996), who is constantly negotiating multiple discourses and ideologies.  
Fang and Duff’s study examines the agency of individual learners through case studies of 
their engagement with Mandarin Chinese popular culture. Based on in-depth interviews, 
they aim to discern ‘what identities they (the participants) prioritize, and how they decode 
(and also construct) various linguistic and other ideologies in the cultural artefacts.’ (Fang 
and Duff). Two of the participants reported in the paper are heritage learners from Hong 
Kong Chinese families, but their reactions to the exercise could not have been more 
divergent. While the male student, John, enthusiastically embraced Taiwanese TV shows, the 
female student, Phillis, chose a Mainland-Hong Kong co-production and rather unwillingly 
watched it in Mandarin Chinese.  John’s enthusiasm certainly has to do with his experience 
of being an Asian male in North America, as he explained to the researcher, but at the same 
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time, we also learned that Cantonese had already been largely absent from his linguistic 
repertoire as his parents only spoke English at home. And the fact that, for John, male idols 
in Taiwanese TV dramas can index Asian masculinity in general seems to suggest that he has 
perhaps also been socialised into the kind of colonial discourse which tends to erase the 
subtle distinctions between minority languages and cultures. One wonders, for example, if 
John had learned Cantonese from a young age, would he have identified more closely with 
male characters in Cantonese TV or films rather than Taiwanese ones like Phillis? Or if 
John’s research interest had been about Sino-Japan relations, would he have found a similar 
sense of identification in Japanese pop culture? These hypothetical questions are not 
intended to suggest a different analytical outcome but rather to point out that even though 
John displayed a high level of critical awareness of gender discourse in North American 
popular culture, his choice of Taiwanese TV was shaped by other social and historical 
conditions as well, such as language shift and loss among the Hong Kong Chinese diaspora 
(cf. Li Wei 1994) and the increased participation of younger generations of Chinese 
immigrants in the public discourses of ethnic, gender, and racial equality (cf. McKay and 
Wong 1996). Similarly, we might speculate to what extent Phillis’s rejection of Mandarin 
Chinese popular culture was also shaped by the increased tension between Hong Kongers 
and mainland Chinese in recent years.  
The complexity of each individual case study reported in Fang and Duff demonstrates 
that the identity of the individual language learner or speaker is better characterised as a 
habitus (Bourdieu 1977) or historical body (Scollon and Scollon 2004) of accumulated 
experiences and dispositions rather than membership in static social categories. Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus is useful here as it presents a dialectic approach to the interplay between 
structure and agency in identity research. On one hand, our habitus is the collection of 
experiences as we move through fields (e.g. class, profession) and respond to their rules and 
regulations, and thus shaped by social structure. On the other hand, habitus is also 
generative in that it engenders new practices that constitute the field in return, thus shaping 
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social structure. As Adams (2006) notes, “Agency and autonomy are embodied in the 
concept of habitus, but they are qualified by the caveat of accumulated history, both personal 
and collective” (515). The critical engagement with popular culture as exemplified in these 
case studies is an example of such reflexive agency, which is itself a form of habitus required 
by certain fields, such as academic studies and research. All three participants in Fang and 
Duff’s paper are university students, and John is planning for a Ph.D. in international 
relations. Gordon’s critique of the propaganda film “The Founding of a Republic” was 
interpreted as coming from ‘a critical audience member from a liberal-democratic political 
system,’ but it could also have been shaped by his prior experience with Chinese films of high 
artistic calibre which inspired him to study the Chinese language in the first place. His 
comments then demonstrate the reflexivity of a film critic as much as that of a citizen from a 
democratic society.  
The high level of critical media literacy demonstrated by Fang and Duff’s participants 
contrasts sharply with the unquestioned internalisation of news discourse observed by 
Sharma. This is, however, not to suggest that the university students are more agentive than 
the tour guides. As Adkin (2003, cited in Adams 2006) reminds us, reflexivity itself comes 
from a privileged position in late modernity. It is a form of cultural resource which is not 
equally distributed across society. Reflexivity or the lack thereof is shaped by one’s 
participation in various fields, and as we have seen in this special issue, tourism and 
education are two cultural fields which have been impacted considerably by the global rise of 
Mandarin Chinese. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate how individuals respond to this 
social change.  
4. Conclusion: ‘The wordliness of Chinese’ 
According to the 2017 edition of Ethnologue (SIL International 2017), there are 1.09 
billion speakers of Mandarin Chinese in the world, of which 193 million (17.7%) are L2 
speakers. On the other hand, 983 million people speak English in the world, of which 611 
million (62.2%) are L2 speakers. The 898 million L1 Speakers of Chinese live in 14 countries, 
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and the 372 million L1 speakers of English live in 106 countries. It took English more than a 
millennium to become a global language it is today, and it has only been four decades since 
the People’s Republic of China opened its doors and joined the free market of exchange. 
Putting these numbers side by side is not to determine which language is more global today 
but to remind us that Chinese is gaining prominence indeed, albeit in a world which has 
already been transformed by the English language. This is the historical context which we 
cannot ignore in any discussion regarding the current status of Mandarin Chinese around 
the world.  
As Pennycook (1994) has argued, the global spread of English is by no means ‘natural, 
neutral and beneficial’. English is not only the language of imperialism (Phillipson 1992), it 
is also the language of global capitalist market (Naysmith 1987 cited in Pennycook 1994), of 
which China has become one of the key players. The increasing economic prowess of China is 
arguably supported by the growing number of Chinese people who can communicate fluently 
in English. After all, English has been a compulsory subject in the national curriculum since 
the early 1980s (Bolton 2006). A recent national language survey put the number of people 
who had learnt English at 390.16 million (Wei and Su 2012). Outside the classroom, millions 
have invested countless hours participating in English corners (S. Gao 2012) and watching 
American TV online (Y. Gao 2015). At the same time, more and more Chinese parents can 
afford to send their children to study abroad at both postgraduate and undergraduate level 
(Bodycott 2009). Therefore, when a group of Chinese engineers were sent to help build a 
power plant in Nigeria, they were not worried about language barriers. In addition to having 
a professional interpreter working for the team, they all spoke some level of English 
themselves, which was sufficient for daily communication with the local company. Thus, it 
seems that the global expansion of Chinese economy does not necessarily lead to the global 
expansion of its language. On the contrary, it has led scholars such as Graddol (2012) to 
argue that China, along with India, holds the key to the future of English.  
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These global trends also impact social relationships on a more local level. One of the 
implications of the global spread of English, as Pennycook (2014) points out, is the creation 
and maintenance of an educated elite within postcolonial societies such as Hong Kong even 
after the colonisers have left. High social and economic prestige is also accorded to the 
English language and its speakers in China. If we take a look at the credentials of young 
CEOs of large Chinese companies, many were educated abroad, mostly in English-speaking 
countries. Outside China, increased English-language proficiency also means that the new 
generation of high-skilled immigrants prefer settling in more affluent suburban areas rather 
than relying on urban enclaves.  
It is against this backdrop that I have attempted to read this special issue through the 
lens of Bourdieu, whose theory of practice brings together several key themes that have 
emerged out of these three papers. Sharma’s paper shows how the economic and social 
values of Chinese as cultural capital were separated in post-colonial Nepal; Chen’s study 
illustrates the convergence between the symbolic value and potential material benefits of 
linguistic differences in the field of tourism; Fang and Duff’s paper demonstrates how 
learner identity and agency could be understood as habitus and reflexivity. Bourdieu, of 
course, is only one of the many theoretical approaches we could use to understand the 
complex interplay between the global and the local. And as demonstrated in these three 
papers, the subject of global Chinese can be linked with a wide range of theories and 
concepts in sociolinguistics, such as language ideology, attitude, and identity. They could 
also benefit from a closer connection with sociolinguistic studies of similar contexts, such as 
tourism, media, and neoliberalism. This would also entail an expansion of methodology 
beyond interviews to include other methods such as interactional analysis, critical discourse 
analysis, and linguistic ethnography. Together, this special issue makes an important 
contribution to research on global Chinese by situating the analysis and discussion firmly in 
the local contexts. To borrow Pennycook (2014)’s term referring to the local complexity of 
English, this special issue moves us a step closer towards the ‘worldliness of Chinese’.  
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